Components Vulnerabilities Pricing MCP API

@dennisk2025/pig-latin-converter 1.0.6 | V… | Sonatype Guide

@dennisk2025/pig-latin-converter

1.0.6

@dennisk2025/pig-latin-converter 1.0.6

PublishedOct 25, 2025•Policy

compliance

Developer Trust Score

N/A

Recommended Version:x.y.z

Latest version with 0 known vulnerabilities that meets your policy.

Compare Versions

Severity

Critical (0)

High (4)

Medium (0)

Low (0)

CVSS Score

0.010.0

EPSS Score

0.01.0

Malware

KEV StatusPublished

8.2CVE-2026-4923

Impact: When using multiple wildcards, combined with at least one parameter, a regular expression can be generated that is vulnerable to ReDoS. This backtracking vulnerability requires the second wildcard to be somewhere other than the end of the path. Unsafe examples: /*foo-*bar-:baz /*a-:b-*c-:d /x/*a-:b/*c/y Safe examples: /*foo-:bar /*foo-:bar-*baz Patches: Upgrade to version 8.4.0. Workarounds: If you are using multiple wildcard parameters, you can check the regex output with a tool such as https://makenowjust-labs.github.io/recheck/playground/ to confirm whether a path is vulnerable.

PublishedMar 30, 2026

8.7CVE-2025-69873

ajv (Another JSON Schema Validator) before 8.18.0 is vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when the $data option is enabled. The pattern keyword accepts runtime data via JSON Pointer syntax ($data reference), which is passed directly to the JavaScript RegExp() constructor without validation. An attacker can inject a malicious regex pattern (e.g., "^(a|a)*$") combined with crafted input to cause catastrophic backtracking. A 31-character payload causes approximately 44 seconds of CPU blocking, with each additional character doubling execution time. This enables complete denial of service with a single HTTP request against any API using ajv with $data: true for dynamic schema validation. This issue is also fixed in version 6.14.0.

7.5CVE-2026-0621

Anthropic's MCP TypeScript SDK versions up to and including 1.25.1 contain a regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) vulnerability in the UriTemplate class when processing RFC 6570 exploded array patterns. The dynamically generated regular expression used during URI matching contains nested quantifiers that can trigger catastrophic backtracking on specially crafted inputs, resulting in excessive CPU consumption. An attacker can exploit this by supplying a malicious URI that causes the Node.js process to become unresponsive, leading to a denial of service.

PublishedJan 6, 2026

8.7CVE-2025-15284

Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: < 6.14.1. Summary The arrayLimit option in qs did not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), only for indexed notation (a[0]=1). This is a consistency bug; arrayLimit should apply uniformly across all array notations. Note: The default parameterLimit of 1000 effectively mitigates the DoS scenario originally described. With default options, bracket notation cannot produce arrays larger than parameterLimit regardless of arrayLimit, because each a[]=valueconsumes one parameter slot. The severity has been reduced accordingly. Details The arrayLimit option only checked limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but did not enforce it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2). Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162): if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) { obj = utils.combine([], leaf); // No arrayLimit check } Working code (lib/parse.js:175): else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) { // Limit checked here obj = []; obj[index] = leaf; } The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays. PoC const qs = require('qs'); const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 }); console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 6 (should be max 5) Note on parameterLimit interaction: The original advisory's "DoS demonstration" claimed a length of 10,000, but parameterLimit (default: 1000) caps parsing to 1,000 parameters. With default options, the actual output is 1,000, not 10,000. Impact Consistency bug in arrayLimit enforcement. With default parameterLimit, the practical DoS risk is negligible since parameterLimit already caps the total number of parsed parameters (and thus array elements from bracket notation). The risk increases only when parameterLimit is explicitly set to a very high value.

High

PublishedFeb 12, 2026

SeverityHigh

PublishedDec 30, 2025