Components Vulnerabilities Security Events Pricing MCP API

Find vulnerabilities. Fix fast with AI.

Search components by package, version, or CVE to get started.

org.apache.karaf.features/framework 4.4.12… | Sonatype Guide

Get full component data and automated fixes with Sonatype Guide.

Sign up for free

org.apache.karaf.features

framework

4.4.12

framework 4.4.12

Latest

org.apache.karaf.features

PublishedSep 22, 2026•Policy

compliance

Developer Trust Score

Recommended Version:x.y.z

Recommended upgrade that meets your policy.

Compare Versions

Severity

Critical (2)

High (1)

Medium (5)

Low (0)

CVSS Score

0.010.0

EPSS Score

0.01.0

Malware

KEV StatusPublished

9.2CVE-2026-110879

jackson-databind validates the outer class of a class-name type ID but accepts attacker-selected classes inside its generic arguments, even when those classes violate the declared type or would be rejected as direct type IDs. This bypasses the generic-argument validation added for CVE-2026-54512 (GHSA-j3rv-43j4-c7qm), of which this is an incomplete fix. DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() checks the outer class against the declared base type and then passes each argument from the type ID to _validateTypeParameter(), which validates the argument against the outer base type rather than enforcing its corresponding declared generic binding. It also invokes validators with arguments that have not passed the subtype check those validators expect. Under the default DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator this accepts an unrelated class inside a generic subtype even when the same class is rejected as a direct type ID. Where an allowIfBaseType(...) rule approves the outer type, Jackson substitutes LaissezFaireSubTypeValidator, so the configured validator no longer restricts the embedded arguments. The element type of a plain array type ID such as [Lpkg.Gadget; is likewise left unvalidated once the array's base type is approved. Affected paths include annotation-based class-name polymorphism with a default Jackson 3.x JsonMapper, configured default typing in both Jackson 2.x and 3.x, and integrations that expose that default typing. The default-validator case requires no application-authored validator: with @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.CLASS), a direct gadget type ID is rejected as "Not a subtype", while a type ID naming a generic wrapper around the same gadget is accepted and deserialized, including attacker-supplied bean properties. Where class-name default typing permits Map, a property declared as Map<String,String> accepts HashMap<FileSystemXmlApplicationContext,String>; map-key discovery then passes the attacker-controlled JSON property name to the selected class's one-string constructor. With Spring on the classpath and attacker-controlled XML the application can load, that constructor loads the XML and invokes ProcessBuilder.start() under the application account, giving arbitrary command execution. This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 2.10.0 and tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 3.0.0. Releases before 2.10.0 are not affected, because PolymorphicTypeValidator was introduced in jackson-databind 2.10.0.

SeverityCritical

PublishedOct 19, 2026

8.3CVE-2026-92877

The JAXB factory methods historically relied solely on `FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING` to prevent XML External Entity (XXE) resolution. On JAXP implementations where that feature alone does not block external entity resolution, an attacker who can get untrusted XML unmarshalled through JAXB can read local files via out-of-band XXE.

PublishedOct 14, 2026

6.3CVE-2026-104721

Path-traversal vulnerability in QOS.CH Sarl Logback-classic on Java (logback-classic module) allows path-traversal vulnerability. More specifically, an MDC-based discriminator value flows unsanitized into a nested FileAppender path, letting an attacker who influences that MDC value (e.g. via an HTTP header) create and append log files outside the intended directory. This issue affects Logback-classic: from 0.9.14 through 1.6.4. This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2026-19880 but involves other attack techniques.

PublishedOct 5, 2026

6.9CVE-2026-91776

TypeDeserializerBase._findDeserializer() in FasterXML jackson-databind caches the resolved deserializer under the raw, attacker-supplied type ID. When name-based polymorphism is configured with a fallback, for example @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.NAME, defaultImpl = ...), every distinct unrecognized type ID resolves to the same fallback deserializer but is retained as its own key in the _deserializers map. That map has no configurable bound and lives for the lifetime of the type deserializer, so an attacker who can repeatedly supply fresh unknown type IDs causes monotonic memory retention across requests. The reporter observed 10,000 retained entries from 10,000 distinct unknown IDs, against a single entry for a control that repeated one unknown ID the same number of times, isolating attacker-controlled key cardinality from request volume. Exploitation requires an application that enables name-based polymorphism with a defaultImpl or equivalent fallback, accepts attacker-influenced type IDs, and reuses a long-lived ObjectMapper across requests. The fix stops caching fallback resolutions for unrecognized IDs and bounds both the number of cached entries and the length of a cacheable type ID.

PublishedSep 15, 2026

6.9CVE-2026-91777

Forward-reference completion for @JsonIdentityInfo object IDs in FasterXML jackson-databind performs a linear scan of the pending-reference accumulator for every resolved ID. The affected paths are CollectionDeserializer.CollectionReferringAccumulator.resolveForwardReference() and the equivalent implementation in MapDeserializer. When a document first creates N unresolved object-ID references in an identity-enabled collection or map and then defines those same IDs in reverse order, completion performs on the order of N * (N + 1) / 2 identity comparisons, so a shallow document whose size grows linearly causes quadratic CPU work during deserialization. The reporter instrumented equals() calls on the ID class and measured exactly 2,003,000 comparisons at N = 2,000, against zero comparisons in the pending-reference lookup path for an equally sized control in which every reference was already resolved. The input requires no deep nesting and no syntactically unusual JSON. Exploitation requires an application that deserializes attacker-influenced JSON into an identity-enabled collection or map. The fix replaces the repeated linear lookup with a keyed pending-reference structure.

PublishedSep 15, 2026

9.2sonatype-2026-006746

Log4j - Remote Code Execution (RCE)

SeverityCritical

PublishedAug 26, 2026

4.8CVE-2026-8484

A heap buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Jansi JNI "ioctl()" wrapper due to a lack of size verification for the argument array before the system call. This can lead to heap corruption and application crashes (DoS). All versions are believed to be vulnerable. This project is unmaintained at the time of CVE assignment.

PublishedJul 11, 2026

5.5sonatype-2015-0286

Apache Karaf - Heap Inspection

PublishedDec 17, 2018