Skip to main content
Components
Vulnerabilities
Pricing
MCP
API
Docs
Sign up
Login
Find vulnerabilities. Fix fast with AI.
Search components by package, version, or CVE to get started.
io.netty/netty-codec-classes-quic 4.2.11.F… | Sonatype Guide
Get full component data and automated fixes with Sonatype Guide.
Sign up for free
maven
io.netty
netty-codec-classes-quic
4.2.11.Final
netty-codec-classes-quic 4.2.11.Final
io.netty
Published
Mar 24, 2026
•
Policy
compliance
maven Registry
Developer Trust Score
Recommended Version:
x.y.z
Recommended upgrade that meets your policy.
Compare Versions
Overview
Overview
Versions
16
Versions
16
Vulnerabilities
2
Vulnerabilities
2
Dependencies
6
Dependencies
6
Severity
Critical
(0)
High
(1)
Medium
(1)
Low
(0)
CVSS Score
0.0
10.0
EPSS Score
0.0
1.0
Malware
KEV Status
Published
Filter
Sort: Published (Newest first)
4.8
CVE-2026-50009
Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, Netty QUIC exposes the stateless reset token on the network path when using the default HMAC-based connection-ID and stateless-reset-token generators. The reset token for the server's current source connection ID can be derived from bytes that appear as the connection ID in QUIC headers after a source-CID rotation. An on-path attacker observing the headers can use the token to perform a Denial of Service by sending a spoofed Stateless Reset packet. Version 4.2.15.Final patches the issue.
affected
Severity
Medium
Published
Jun 15, 2026
7.5
CVE-2026-44894
Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. NoQuicTokenHandler is the tokenHandler used when the application does not set one. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, its writeToken() returns false (server will not send Retry — acceptable), but validateToken() unconditionally `return 0`. In QuicheQuicServerCodec.handlePacket(), a non-negative return from validateToken() is interpreted as 'token is valid, ODCID starts at offset 0', causing the server to call quiche_accept as if the client's address had been validated by a Retry round-trip. Per RFC 9000 §8.1, a validated address lifts the 3× anti-amplification send limit. Thus any attacker who includes ANY non-empty token bytes in an Initial packet — with a spoofed victim source IP — causes the Netty server to treat the victim as validated and reflect full-size handshake flights (certificates, etc.) toward it without the 3× cap. The correct 'no token handler' semantics would be to return -1 (invalid) so the normal un-validated path and amplification limit apply. Version 4.2.15.Final patches the issue.
affected
Severity
High
Published
Jun 8, 2026
