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validate

4.1.0

validate 4.1.0

gov.nasa.pds

PublishedApr 22, 2026•Policy

compliance

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Severity

Critical (5)

High (16)

Medium (18)

Low (2)

CVSS Score

0.010.0

EPSS Score

0.01.0

Malware

KEV StatusPublished

6.3CVE-2026-49844

org.apache.logging.log4j:log4j-api - Improper serialization of non-finite floating-point values in MapMessage.asJson()

PublishedJul 10, 2026

6.3CVE-2026-59889

Jackson Databind - Authorization bypass on JsonView Setter/Field

PublishedJul 8, 2026

6.3CVE-2026-59888

Jackson Databind - JsonIgnore annotations Bypass

PublishedJul 7, 2026

7.5CVE-2026-9563

In Eclipse Parsson published Maven Central artifacts before version 1.1.8, the JSON parser did not enforce a default maximum on the number of characters consumed while parsing a single JSON document. Applications that parse attacker- controlled JSON can be forced to consume excessive CPU and memory by processing very large documents, including large arrays, objects, strings, numbers, whitespace, or nested structures, resulting in a denial of service. Eclipse Parsson 1.1.8 introduces a configurable maximum parsing limit with a default limit of 15 million parser-consumed characters.

PublishedJul 3, 2026

8.7CVE-2026-54399

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in the HTTP/1.1 message parser in Apache HttpComponents Core (5.4.2 and earlier, 5.5-beta1 and earlier) allows an remote attacker to cause a denial of service through memory exhaustion by sending messages with excessive number of headers / excessive header length

PublishedJul 2, 2026

7.5CVE-2026-54428

Allocation of resources without limits or throttling in the HTTP/2 HPACK decoder in Apache HttpComponents Core (5.4.2 and earlier, 5.5-beta1 and earlier) allows an remote attacker to cause a denial of service through memory exhaustion by sending oversized compressed header blocks before the HTTP/2 SETTINGS acknowledgement causes the configured header list size limit to be applied.

PublishedJul 2, 2026

6.9CVE-2026-54516

jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.21.0 until 2.21.4 and 3.1.4, POJOPropertiesCollector._renameProperties() allows a property with @JsonProperty("renamed") on the getter and @JsonIgnore on the setter to be renamed rather than dropped. With MapperFeature.INFER_PROPERTY_MUTATORS enabled (default), the private backing field is retained; during deserialization BeanDeserializerFactory.addBeanProps() sees hasField()==true, builds a FieldProperty, and makes the backing field writable. An attacker supplying the renamed JSON key writes the backing field directly, bypassing the @JsonIgnore on the setter. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.4.

PublishedJun 16, 2026

6.9CVE-2026-54515

jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.8.0 until 2.18.9, 2.21.5, and 3.1.4, in BeanDeserializerBase.createContextual(), per-property @JsonIgnoreProperties exclusions are applied by _handleByNameInclusion(), producing a contextual deserializer whose BeanPropertyMap has the ignored properties removed. The subsequent per-property case-insensitivity block (triggered by @JsonFormat(ACCEPT_CASE_INSENSITIVE_PROPERTIES)) rebuilds from this._beanProperties (the original, unfiltered map) instead of contextual._beanProperties, then overwrites the filtered map — restoring every property _handleByNameInclusion had just removed. The ignored property becomes writable again. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.9, 2.21.5, and 3.1.4.

PublishedJun 16, 2026

6.9CVE-2026-54514

jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.0.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, JDKFromStringDeserializer constructed InetSocketAddress with new InetSocketAddress(host, port), which performs eager DNS name resolution for hostname inputs at deserialization time. An application that binds untrusted JSON into a type containing an InetSocketAddress field issues an attacker-chosen DNS query during readValue, before any application-level validation or connect logic. The fix uses InetSocketAddress.createUnresolved(host, port), deferring DNS to an explicit connect. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.

PublishedJun 16, 2026

9.2CVE-2026-54512

jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV. If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization. An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.

SeverityCritical

PublishedJun 16, 2026

6.9CVE-2026-54517

jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.21.0 until 2.21.4 and 3.1.4, in BeanDeserializer._deserializeUsingPropertyBased, the active-view (@JsonView) filter was applied only to creator properties; the regular property-buffering branch performed no prop.visibleInView(activeView) check. A change making SetterlessProperty.isMerging() return true routed setterless Collection/Map properties through this unguarded path, so a setterless collection annotated with a restricted @JsonView is populated from attacker JSON even when the active view excludes it. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.21.4 and 3.1.4.

PublishedJun 16, 2026

9.3CVE-2026-54513

jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.Builder.allowIfSubTypeIsArray() allowlists any array type based only on clazz.isArray(), without validating the array's component (element) type against the configured allowlist. A PTV built with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() plus an explicit concrete-type allowlist therefore still permits EvilType[] even though EvilType is not allowlisted. When Jackson deserializes the elements and no per-element type IDs are present, it instantiates the component type directly with no further PTV check, bypassing the allowlist. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.

SeverityCritical

PublishedJun 16, 2026

6.9CVE-2026-54518

jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.21.0 until 2.21.4 and 3.1.4, UnwrappedPropertyHandler.processUnwrappedCreatorProperties() replays buffered JSON into creator parameters but never consults prop.visibleInView(activeView). The normal property-based creator path gates creator properties on the active view, but this unwrapped-creator replay path bypasses that check, so a constructor parameter annotated with both @JsonView(AdminView.class) and @JsonUnwrapped is populated from attacker JSON even when a more restrictive view is active. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.21.4 and 3.1.4.

PublishedJun 16, 2026

6.9CVE-2026-50020

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, before reading the first request-line, `HttpObjectDecoder` skips every byte for which `Character.isISOControl(b)` is `true` (0x00–0x1F and 0x7F) as well as all whitespace. RFC 9112 §2.2 only asks servers to ignore empty CRLF lines preceding the request-line — a carefully scoped robustness allowance intended to handle HTTP/1.0 POST workarounds. Silently absorbing NUL bytes, SOH, STX, and other non-CRLF control characters goes significantly beyond this, and can be exploited for request-boundary confusion in pipelined or multiplexed transports where a front-end component treats those bytes differently. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

PublishedJun 15, 2026

7.5CVE-2026-50010

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, SimpleTrustManagerFactory.engineGetTrustManagers() and related paths wrap any user-supplied plain X509TrustManager in X509TrustManagerWrapper, which extends X509ExtendedTrustManager but implements the 3-arg checkServerTrusted(chain, authType, SSLEngine) by discarding the SSLEngine and calling the 2-arg delegate. Because the object now IS an X509ExtendedTrustManager, neither SunJSSE's internal AbstractTrustManagerWrapper nor Netty's own OpenSslX509TrustManagerWrapper will re-wrap it to add endpoint-identification. Consequently, even though Netty 4.2 sets endpointIdentificationAlgorithm="HTTPS" by default, a client built with `SslContextBuilder.forClient().trustManager(somePlainX509TrustManager)` performs no hostname verification at all. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

PublishedJun 15, 2026

7.5CVE-2026-45416

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, SslClientHelloHandler.decode() reads the 24-bit TLS handshake length and, when the ClientHello does not fit in the first record, eagerly allocates `ctx.alloc().buffer(handshakeLength)` (line 161). The guard at line 140 is `handshakeLength > maxClientHelloLength && maxClientHelloLength != 0`, and the commonly-used SniHandler/AbstractSniHandler constructors (SniHandler(Mapping), SniHandler(AsyncMapping), AbstractSniHandler()) pass maxClientHelloLength=0 and handshakeTimeoutMillis=0, so the length guard is disabled and no timeout is scheduled. A 16 MiB request exceeds the default pooled chunk size and becomes a huge/unpooled allocation performed immediately. The buffer is retained in the handler until the channel closes. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

PublishedJun 11, 2026

8.1CVE-2026-44249

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-handler prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, an attacker can bypass IPv6 subnet rules due to an incorrect masking operation in IpSubnetFilterRule.compareTo(). Valid public IP addresses can bypass the restrictions. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

PublishedJun 9, 2026

5.3CVE-2026-50560

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces an attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset. There is a setting in the http2 specification called `SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE`. When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows: read the request; proxy the request to the origin; attempt to produce a response; and create an exception while writing the headers for the response. Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

PublishedJun 9, 2026

7.5CVE-2026-48043

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-codec-http2 prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, the `DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener` class orchestrates HTTP/2 decompression by embedding a per-stream `EmbeddedChannel` that runs the appropriate decompression codec (gzip, deflate, zstd) and forwards decompressed chunks to a wrapped listener. Each decompressed chunk is a pooled `ByteBuf` handed to an anonymous `ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter` tail handler, which becomes the sole owner responsible for releasing it. A remote peer could send frames that would result in the flow-controller throwing and so trigger a resource leak which at the end might take down the whole JVM due OOME. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

PublishedJun 8, 2026

5.3sonatype-2026-003669

io.netty : netty-codec-http2 - Denial of Service (DoS) [CVE-2026-47244]

PublishedJun 8, 2026

9.8CVE-2026-42581

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, HttpObjectDecoder strips a conflicting Content-Length header when a request carries both Transfer-Encoding: chunked and Content-Length, but only for HTTP/1.1 messages. The guard is absent for HTTP/1.0. An attacker that sends an HTTP/1.0 request with both headers causes Netty to decode the body as chunked while leaving Content-Length intact in the forwarded HttpMessage. Any downstream proxy or handler that trusts Content-Length over Transfer-Encoding will disagree on message boundaries, enabling request smuggling. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

SeverityCritical

PublishedMay 7, 2026

6.5CVE-2026-42580

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Netty's chunk size parser silently overflows int, enabling request smuggling attacks. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

PublishedMay 7, 2026

7.5CVE-2026-42583

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Lz4FrameDecoder allocates a ByteBuf of size decompressedLength (up to 32 MB per block) before LZ4 runs. A peer only needs a 21-byte header plus compressedLength payload bytes - 22 bytes if compressedLength == 1 - to force that allocation. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

PublishedMay 7, 2026

8.7CVE-2026-42587

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, HttpContentDecompressor accepts a maxAllocation parameter to limit decompression buffer size and prevent decompression bomb attacks. This limit is correctly enforced for gzip and deflate encodings via ZlibDecoder, but is silently ignored when the content encoding is br (Brotli), zstd, or snappy. An attacker can bypass the configured decompression limit by sending a compressed payload with Content-Encoding: br instead of Content-Encoding: gzip, causing unbounded memory allocation and out-of-memory denial of service. The same vulnerability exists in DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener for HTTP/2 connections. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

PublishedMay 7, 2026

9.1CVE-2026-42584

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, HttpClientCodec pairs each inbound response with an outbound request by queue.poll() once per response, including for 1xx. If the client pipelines GET then HEAD and the server sends 103, then 200 with GET body, then 200 for HEAD, the queue pairs HEAD with the first 200. The HEAD rule then skips reading that message’s body, so the GET entity bytes stay on the stream and the following 200 is parsed from the wrong offset. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

SeverityCritical

PublishedMay 7, 2026

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