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com.snowflake/snowflake-kafka-connector 4.… | Sonatype Guide
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maven
com.snowflake
snowflake-kafka-connector
4.2.3
snowflake-kafka-connector 4.2.3
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com.snowflake
Published
Oct 23, 2026
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6.9
CVE-2026-18401
The non-blocking (asynchronous) JSON parser in jackson-core does not enforce the maxNumberLength constraint defined in StreamReadConstraints (default: 1000 characters). An attacker able to submit JSON to an application that uses the async parser API can supply a number token of arbitrary length, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a denial of service. The synchronous parser enforces this limit correctly, so the constraint is applied inconsistently depending on which parsing API the application uses. Root cause: the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase and related classes never invokes the number length validation methods. Number parsing methods such as _finishNumberIntegralPart() accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length check, then call _valueComplete() to finalize the token. _valueComplete() does not call resetInt() or resetFloat(), which are the methods in ParserBase where validateIntegerLength() and validateFPLength() are performed. Because that validation step is skipped, maxNumberLength is never enforced on the async code path. Impact: an attacker sending a JSON document containing an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (for example a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application) can cause unbounded allocation in the TextBuffer and an OutOfMemoryError. If the application subsequently calls getBigIntegerValue() or getDecimalValue(), the JVM may additionally be tied up in O(n^2) BigInteger parsing, causing CPU-based denial of service. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required. This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from version 2.15.0 through 2.18.5 and from 2.19.0 through 2.21.0, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0 through 3.0.x. Versions prior to 2.15.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints -- which defines the maxNumberLength setting -- was first introduced in jackson-core 2.15.0, so no such constraint exists to be bypassed in earlier releases. Note that GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq records the lower bound of the affected 2.x range as 2.0.0.
affected
Severity
Medium
Published
Oct 15, 2026
6.0
CVE-2026-47848
In specific scenarios involving WebSocket handshake redirects to a different origin, the Reactor Netty WebSocket client may leak credentials. In order for this to happen, the HTTP client must have been explicitly configured to follow redirects. Reactor Netty 1.3.0 - 1.3.6 Reactor Netty 1.1.0 - 1.2.18 Reactor Netty 1.0.52 and earlier
affected
Severity
Medium
Published
Aug 21, 2026
6.3
CVE-2026-47843
In specific scenarios involving multiple clients with different DNS resolver configurations, Reactor Netty may incorrectly reuse a previously configured DNS resolver. Reactor Netty 1.3.0 - 1.3.6 Reactor Netty 1.1.0 - 1.2.18 Reactor Netty 1.0.52 and earlier
affected
Severity
Medium
Published
Aug 21, 2026
6.5
sonatype-2020-0026
netty-handler - Improper Certificate Validation [ formerly CVE-2023-4586 ]
affected
Severity
Medium
Published
Feb 4, 2020